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1. Introduction 
 
The symposium to which Lauri Mälksoo kindly invited me in Tartu at the 
end of April 2006 was a remarkable experience. Leading academics from 
Eastern Europe have given very varied and exhaustive accounts of the 
contribution (Linda: i.e. here: to the European traditions of international law) 
which scholars, from what was the other side of the Iron Curtain, had made 
to the European traditions of international law. Vivid memories of the 
Russian and Soviet Empires were everywhere to be seen in Tartu, and Lauri 
Mälksoo’s own contribution on von Bulmerincq showed also the pervasive 
German influence in Eastern Europe. My contribution will be not dissimilar 
to the latter as I will explore aspects of the manner in which Hersch 
Lauterpacht dealt with German traditions of international law as he made the 
transition from Austria-Hungary to London in the immediate aftermath of 
the First World War. My approach will not be biographical, but concentrate 
instead upon a textual exposition and critical reflection upon aspects of 
Hersch Lauterpacht’s Private Law Sources and Analogies of International 
Law.1 I think that such an exercise is particularly valuable at the present 
time, now that most parts of Europe, not Russia or the Ukraine, are together in the  
same economic and political union. In my view, a small but not insignificant part 
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1 (Longmans, London, 1927). With special reference to international arbitration. 
 
[end of page 83] 
 
of the task of evolving common European approaches to 
international law is to search out the influences brought about by past 
migrations of scholars across Europe. 
In a wider context, even apart from the holding of the conference in 
Tartu, it is a remarkable fact that there is a considerable increase in interest 
in the history of international law at the present time. One might speculate 
about this fact. Is the interest purely aesthetic, indeed romantic? The 
beautiful surroundings of Tartu, as an ancient European university city, and 
Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, encourage reflection on a much less troubled 
19th and early 20th century and may lead us to ask whether we can leap back 
to these times of apparently common European cultural solidarity, when 
leading intellectuals and academics could move across state boundaries with 
relative ease, when multilingualism was normal and cultural barriers, at least 
within Europe, unimportant. 
The interest in historical explorations can also be more pressing, 
attributable to a sense of crisis in the present discipline, attributable to the 
failure of the international legal order to rise to new challenges (such as the 
so-called War on Terrorism or Militant Islam), or perhaps even more 
seriously, a loss of continuity of the discipline with its spiritual, cultural or 
other traditions. In this case, it might be hoped that a return to historical 
roots could serve a purpose of renewal of foundations. It is very much in this 
last spirit that I intend to undertake a purely textual analysis of one of 
Lauterpacht’s major works. 
A first positive aspect of this exercise is that Lauterpacht identified a 
problem of international society, which is still with us – the very strong state 
that has a legal philosophy not appearing to encourage acceptance of a larger 
international legal order. In Lauterpacht’s time that state was taken to be 
Germany, but the problem whether international legal culture can put up 
resistance to a single super-power remains. A second positive aspect of the 
exercise is the breadth of linguistic and philosophical culture Lauterpacht 
could bring to the analysis of an issue. 
There are two more problematic aspects of his undertaking, which it is 
the predominant aim of this short article to argue. Firstly, Lauterpacht made 
a scapegoat out of Germany as a way of responding to the crisis of the overpowerful 
state. He treated German legal culture as monolithic and could not 
recognise the diversity and complexity of opinion within Germany. Equally 
he equated with Germany alone features of the legal philosophy of the state, 
which were part of a common European heritage, from which he purported 
to separate and single out Germany. Secondly, the remedy which 
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Lauterpacht offered, to overcome contemporary difficulties with the legal 
philosophy of the state, was to contribute significantly to the crisis that many 
agree international law faces at the present time, that it is a purely technical, 
even formalistic, discipline that does not have the wider legal humanistic 
resources to confront the crises that international society now faces. The 
article concludes by asking what if Lauterpacht had chosen to go, as he 
could have, in a different direction, making a different spiritual and cultural 
journey. 
 
 
2. Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, Aspects. 
 
Lauterpacht came to London in 1923 and the above title was his dissertation 
of 1927. In his comprehensive and systematic survey of Lauterpacht’s work, 
while at the same time very brief consideration of the above volume, 
Koskenniemi sets out very clearly the ideological goals that Lauterpacht had, 
or at least is widely understood to have had. Law’s unity is a scientific 
postulate, since law abhors a vacuum as much as physics. A topic must be 
considered as a totality, which can be done through analogy. Legal analogy 
resembles that used by scientists and logicians. In Koskenniemi’s own 
words, “analogy is the lawyer’s means of supplementing fragmentary or 
contradictory materials so as to ensure law’s systemic unity”.2 Liberal 
principles, in Koskenniemi’s wider cultural argument, require appeal to such 
universal principles of science as logical consistency and correspondence 
with facts. Traditional legal positivism fails because it is logically 
incoherent. State will, as Koskenniemi summarises the argument, cannot be 
the ultimate source of law because one has still to look for a rule that the 
state will binds.3 
The heart of Lauterpacht’s argument, as Koskenniemi rightly points out, 
is that positivism is at variance with the facts. Judges and arbitrators use 
municipal jurisprudence and general principles of law in a wide range of 
matters covering large areas of international law. Essentially they are using 
private law concepts.4 This allows Koskenniemi to draw once again on his 
wider cultural perspective that scientism is accompanied by methodological 
individualism, a liberal political theory. The state cannot stand between the 
individual and the international legal order.5 Koskenniemi quotes 
 
2 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge University Press, 
2002) p. 364. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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Lauterpacht from the book, concerning the supposed mystical nature of 
sovereignty, or the mystical nature of the relationship of state territory to the 
state. Instead the legal order can divide and limit the state. “All law has to do 
with regulating human behaviour; analogy is really but an aspect of the law’s 
wholeness.”6 All of this allows Lauterpacht to embark upon a “progressive” 
political programme, in Koskenniemi’s words.7 The programme, quoting 
Koskenniemi, “ puts the individual into the centre and views the State as a 
pure instrumentality. Behind nationalism and diplomacy the world remains a 
community of individuals and the rule of law is nothing other than the state 
of peace among them.” 8 
Supposedly, the ideological assumption might be made that private law 
analogies signify concern for private persons and individual welfare. 
However, this is precisely one of the major elisions of thought that my own 
small contribution will challenge. Lauterpacht himself does say that: 
 
“The rejection of private law is, to a considerable extent, prompted 
by the conviction that the interests protected by international law 
are fundamentally different from those regulated by private law. It 
is the conviction embodied in that conception of the absolute value 
of the State, which, under the influence of the idealistic 
philosophy and political theory, was determining the trend of 
modern international law. The possibility of private law playing 
any part at all in the development of international law is therefore 
conditioned by a previous abandonment of that political aspect of 
the doctrine of sovereignty and by the acceptance of the view that 
acts of States and of their organs are actions of men, for ordinary 
human purposes, governed by standards of justice and morality 
accepted by States and their peoples within their territories, and 
that the interests of States are only in degree different from those 
protected by other collective bodies or from interests of 
individuals”.9 
 
Even further, it certainly appears that Lauterpacht regarded himself as an economic  
liberal, if not a methodological individualist. In the same part of the book he says,  
almost at once, that the interests of individuals are chiefly economic, but, at the  
same time, as a rule, in international relations, “the political activities of States in 
 6 Ibid., p. 365, citing H. Lauterpacht, infra note 9, pp. 71–79. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law 
(Lawbook Exchange, Union, NJ, 2001) p. 72. 
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the field of international relations are primarily devoted to safeguarding 
collective economic interests, no matter under what disguise they happen to appear”.10  
Lauterpacht continues to insist that “between individuals, autonomous groups, and  
States there is a legal difference of degree only”.11 
In this part of my short article I wish simply to illustrate that Lauterpact 
was, in his unqualified acceptance of the legal validity of treaties and 
arbitrations, which were dominated by Western countries, in particular his 
own adopted country, Great Britain, a legal positivist, who accepted, without 
hesitation, the colonialist and imperialist legal policies of his new country. 
The central point is that the jurisprudence and treaty law to which 
Lauterpacht has recourse has no ethical affinity at all with the primacy of the 
individual. So he insists that the law of the acquisition of territory does come 
from a private law analogy, from Roman law, but all it comes to is a blank 
cheque for the colonial power. The principle dominating theory and practice 
of the law “is that based on the Roman law rules of possession, i.e. on the 
connection of animus with corpus, of the bodily act with the mental 
attitude”.12 From Grotius, through Vattel, to the Berlin Declaration of 1885, 
Articles 34 and 35, the same principle asserts itself, the requirement of 
corpus and animus. “It was of the greatest importance as an ordering element 
in the development of international law in the period following the discovery 
of the New World.”13 
The reason Lauterpacht thinks private law analogy is effective is that it 
expresses what is for him the reality that territory is simply an object which 
states can acquire and dispose of as they please and not part of the elements 
that go up to make a viable community, i.e. to say a nation or other ethnic 
group which has historically been tied to a particular location, so that 
uprooting or otherwise removing it would be, in some sense, ethically 
problematic. Lauterpacht contrasts two theories of the legal nature of 
territorial sovereignty, the object theory and the space theory. The former 
theory, held mainly by Anglo-American international lawyers, such as Hall, 
Fenwick and Hyde, is that a state can be said to have a proprietary right over 
its territory, which it owns exclusively and may dispose of. This concept, 
primarily presented as Hall’s, is not patrimonial as individuals are not 
subjects of international law, in Hall’s view. Whether the theory is based 
upon dominium or imperium, in both cases, says Lauterpacht, “the territory 
 
10 Ibid., p. 73. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 100. 
13 Ibid., p. 101. 
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is construed as an object of the State’s right. And it is this ‘object theory’ 
which regards the relation of the State to its territory as identical with or as 
analogous to the private law right of property …”14 
The “space theory” rejects the view that the state can rule “over a lifeless 
object of nature, such as territory”. The territory is instead an element of the 
state, and “it can no more be regarded as the object of a state’s right, than the 
body of a man can be said to be his property. The territory is the space 
within which the jurisdiction of the state is exercised. The state rules within 
the territory, not over it.”15 Germans hold this view, of course. Another 
German theory is the so-called “competence theory”, that territorial 
sovereignty is a sum of the competences ratione loci which international law 
concedes to the state. The tone of Lauterpacht’s scholarship is important to 
experience. It is dogmatic and authoritarian: 
 
“It is not intended to discuss here this doctrine in detail. Unrelated 
as it is to the practice of states, it is not likely to be of lasting 
influence. It possesses, however the merit of having clearly 
demonstrated that the view which regards the territory as an 
element of the conception of state is untenable …16 
 
A cursory survey of the practice of governments with regard to 
modes of cession of territory will show that they have never 
ceased to regard the territory as an object of the state’s right …”17 
 
This cursory survey, in Lauterpacht’s view shows that “in numerous recent 
treaties, territories or spheres of influence have been mutually ceded in a 
way which vividly recalls to mind the character of exchange. The treaty of 
July 1890 between Great Britain and Germany relating to territory in East 
Africa and to Heligoland, and the agreement between France and Great 
Britain of April 1904 relating to Morocco and Egypt, may be quoted as 
examples.” 18 Lauterpacht goes on to give various examples of territory 
transferred for the purpose of a pledge, such as the Japanese occupation of 
We-hai-wei as a guarantee of the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 and, 
of course, Article 428 of the Treaty of Versailles, providing for the Allied 
 
14 Ibid., p. 92. 
15 Ibid., p. 93. 
16 Ibid., pp. 93, 94. 
17 Ibid., p. 96. 
18 Ibid., p. 97. 
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occupation of territory in Germany west of the Rhine for fifteen years, to 
secure performance of the Treaty.19 
 
 
3. A Teutonic Aversion to Acquisitive Prescription? 
 
The engagement of Lauterpacht’s scholarship can be seen in his arguments 
in favour of the acceptance of a place for acquisitive prescription in 
international law. Here he directs his rage against the most prominent 
German textbook writer on international law, Franz von Liszt. Lauterpacht 
quotes numerous British-American treaties, British, as well as Hague 
arbitrations, which support the doctrine of acquisitive prescription. He then 
goes on to single out von Liszt as someone opposed to his view. It is clear 
that for Lauterpacht no decent or reasonable person can be opposed to 
private law analogies in international law. In his own words: 
 
“Stubborn opposition against this rule of private law could only 
come from writers who emphasise the fundamental difference 
between international and private law. In a community in which 
force constitutes right, and in which actual possession, regardless 
of time, confers a title, the institute of prescription is unnecessary. 
If no possession is illegal, if every possession is lawful, then 
clearly there is no need for a jural principle calculated to legalise 
an originally illegal position. This is, for instance, the view of 
Liszt, who speaks of the direct law-creating influence which mere 
force, especially conquest, has in the domain of international law. 
This opinion, although generally rejected, is nevertheless 
instructive as showing the theoretical sources from which the 
opposition to private law arises …”20 
 
What von Liszt actually said was that the notion of acquisitive prescription 
did not of itself have the character of a law creating fact. The first reason 
was the significance which attaches to the tacit consent of a state, which 
finds itself injured in its interests through a displacement (dislocation) in 
international relations. The second was the significance of force, where von 
Liszt makes clear mention of the absence of the usefulness of the private law 
analogy. There is no English translation of what he says, so I will have to 
offer a translation and summary. In my interpretation what he says is that in 
international law a state can acquire a foreign territory through force by 
going to war and without having to justify this act by providing a 
 
19 Ibid., p. 98. 
20 Ibid., p. 117. 
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justification of title in the sense which would be understand in private law, 
and without having to wait for a long passage of time. Von Liszt is saying 
that the essence of this possibility is the power of the conquering state, and, 
for the sake of understanding the reality of this process, it is not affected by 
the absence of a peace treaty. In my view this last remark reflects the fact 
that such treaties did not become invalid because of coercion in their 
conclusion. He is really saying that such treaties do not give more than the 
appearance of legality in a private law sense. Looked at in this way, Liszt’s 
very concise argument is that acquisitive prescription could be a useful way 
in private law systems to resolve originally illegal or at least forceful 
possession of land in private law where a long period of uninterrupted 
possession has followed, but that the usefulness of the concept in 
international law is limited by the practice of conquest, the legal effect of 
which is generally resolved very openly and much more quickly. It works 
both ways in his analysis. A conquering state does not have to wait until a 
so-called time immemorial, while a victim state can be assumed to have 
tacitly consented to a loss of rights very quickly. In these types of situations 
the purpose of acquisitive prescription, to achieve stability or order, is 
achieved all the more quickly by other means more suited to the present 
condition of states.21 
The actual text of von Liszt concerning the second justification for not 
regarding acquisitive prescription as a law creating fact reads as follows. The 
ground for rejection lies: 
 
“in der unmittelbar rechtsbegründenden Wirkung, die auf dem 
Gebiete des Völkerrechts die nackte Tatsache, daher auch die 
Gewalt, vor allem als Eroberung, hat. Die kriegerische 
Erwerbung eines fremden Staatsgebietes erstreckt, ganz 
abgesehen von dem Friedensvertrage, die Staatsgewalt des 
erobernden Staates ohne weiteres auf das neuerworbene Gebiet, 
ohne dass es einer Ersitzung im Sinne des Privatrechts, 
insbesondere also des Ablaufes eines längeren Zeitraums, bedarf; 
und wenn ein Staat ohne Widerspruch es zulässt, dass seine 
Kolonien von einem andern Staat besetzt und verwaltet werden, so 
muss ein Verzicht auf die ihm zustehenden Rechte angenommen 
 
 
21 For a German version, I choose the last edition for which von Liszt was 
responsible, the 11th of 1918, Berlin, Springer Verlag. Lauterpacht himself used the 
posthumous 12th edition of Fleischmann of 1925. The 11th edition is in this respect 
identical to the 4th and 9th editions. 
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werden, ohne dass erst die Verjährung seiner Ansprüche durch 
den Ablauf der Zeit abgewartet zu werden braucht.”22 
 
Von Liszt’s work was regarded at the time as the most standard text in the 
German language.23 There was a French translation of the ninth edition 
(1913) arranged by the Carnegie Foundation, with a preface by James Brown 
Scott in 1927. Scott, in his preface, makes the vital point that the reason for 
the translation was that von Liszt’s work was the most remarkable 
representation of a whole period of international law, which was brought to 
an end with the First World War. In other words it was representative of an 
epoch. It had to be taken alongside the works of Westlake, Bonfils, Fauchille 
and Lawrence as characterising the positivist epoch in which the dominant 
concept was the sovereignty of the state, accompanied by the traditional 
notion of suprema potestas, protecting absolutely the authority of the prince 
or minister, but constituting a real obstacle to the development of 
international law.24 
Scott goes on to give his opinion that von Liszt’s work was 
incomparably the best of its kind in the pre-War period. It had the further 
merit that von Liszt was a veritable precursor of the post-War period (he 
died in 1919). About half the book is devoted to studying the institutions 
states are developing to express their common interests in an international 
community. Scott notes that von Liszt does present a theory of war as the 
ultima ratio of the positivist period of international law before the War. 
However, Scott adds that it is necessary to take into account this traditional 
concept of law until the day when the evolution of international relations 
will be such that one will be able to oppose victoriously the sovereignty of 
law to the sovereignty of the state.25 
 
 
4. The Reality of the State – A German Idea or a European Heritage 
 
The last discussion has been a useful introduction to the wider philosophical 
question whether there is no significant distinction between the problems of 
 
22 F. von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht, p. 156. 
23 F. Herrmann, Das Standardwerk, Franz von Liszt und das Völkerrecht (Nomos, 
Baden, 2001) pp. 126–129. The method of this article is not biographical, but one 
might mention that Herrmann characterises von Liszt, who was politically active and 
participated in public debate about German war aims, was a left liberal, who 
opposed the view of the World War as a war of conquest. 
 
24 F. von Liszt, Le Droit International, traduction par Gilbert Gidel avec Leon 
Alcindor, Avant-propos de James Brown Scott (Pedone, Paris, 1927) p. vii. 
25 Ibid., pp.vii–ix. 
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the rule of law at the national and the international level. In the entry on 
acquisitive prescription in the Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, it is mentioned that whether it existed, what it required, in 
terms of time limits, etc. “were classical subjects of contention”.26 The 
arguments against the idea being part of international law concerned the 
level of development of the international legal order. Those opposed to the 
idea being part of the law thought international law not evolved enough – its 
concepts and institutions not sufficiently comprehensive, complex and robust 
– to support it. The idea behind this opposition was that it was better, given 
the centrality of the state, to treat the inactivity or silence of the state as 
equitable with implied waiver. Acquiescence places the decisive element in 
the behaviour of the state threatened, rather than in the lapse of time as such. 
It may have been thought a good idea for the preservation of order not to 
permit uncertainty through inactivity to be prolonged beyond a certain 
period of time.27 At any rate it is difficult to see how very great moral or 
political issues could be thought to hang on the question of the existence or 
non-existence of the private law concept of acquisitive prescription. States 
do not become any more harmless because a few arbitration law tribunals 
apply private law concepts to resolve their disputes. 
In the theoretical part of Private Law Sources and Analogies of 
International Law, Lauterpacht identifies the Germans as the opponents of 
his wish that private law be regarded as a source of international law, 
particularly Holtzendorff and Bulmerincq in the late 19th century. 
Holztendorff objects that the analogy breaks down because private relations 
among persons are permanently subject to authoritative legislation.28 
Bulmerincq asserts that the recourse to analogy has impeded the growth of 
international law.29 Neither provide elaborate justifications for their position, 
but Lauterpacht sees it as due to the fact that international law around 1900 
stood where it was left with Hegel’s theory of the state as an absolute end, as 
an absolute power on Earth, which cannot be subject to any will but its own. 
International law is then an external municipal public law of the individual 
state. In Lauterpacht’s words, there is no general rule for the international 
community. Quoting Hegel, he says states are in relations with one another 
as in a state of nature: “Their rights are not realised in a general rule which is 
 
26 Entry by C. August in vol. 10 of the Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
(North Holland, Amsterdam, 1987) p. 327. 
27 Ibid., pp.327, 328. 
28 Lauterpacht, supra note 9, p. 19. 
29 Ibid. 
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so constituted as to have power over them, but their rights are realised only 
through their particular wills.” This leaves, in Lauterpacht’s words, no other 
law for the state but the purpose of its own self.30 Lauterpacht goes on to 
treat Lasson and Kaufmann as the key figures representing the mood of pre- 
1914 Germany.31 He does go so far as to say that beyond Germany this 
perspective was also dominant, although “British-American international 
law never became completely divorced from the conception of international 
law as embodying not only positive rules set by sovereign states, but also 
principles of legal justice, reason, and equity …”32 However, Lauterpacht 
thinks, 
 
“it will serve no useful purpose to deny that the modern science of 
international law follows closely the Hegelian conception of State 
and sovereignty. Accordingly, it will not be found surprising that 
its expounders did not view with sympathy any larger reception of 
private law. For private law suggests subordination to an objective 
rule, and not a loose coordination of wills; it suggests interests 
valued by law and measured by it, but certainly not constituting 
the formal source and the ultimate legal foundation of its validity; 
it suggests mainly economic interests for the satisfaction of mainly 
economic wants, and not interests of a ‘public’ higher, absolute.”33 
 
I submit that there are real difficulties in identifying and resolving the 
difficulties of governing international society if they are equated exclusively 
with a supposedly monolithic German, Hegelian tendency to deify the state. 
Lauterpacht first attempts to draw a German-British dichotomy and argue 
that the British avoid the mystical entity of the state. For instance, Westlake 
stresses that it is men upon whom international law imposes rights and 
duties, and not the mystical entity called the state.34 Indeed, Lauterpacht here 
quotes a variety of British constitutional theorists and legal historians for the 
proposition that mystical meant the notion that even the common legal idea 
of corporation could signify something “greater and wiser than the sum of 
the citizens who compose it”, for “there is nothing in the State but what its 
members give it”. He claims they go back to the founding tradition of 
international law, that the law of nations is addressed to individuals. 
Significantly, he is aware of the continued life of the civilian tradition in 
 
30 Ibid., pp. 44, 45. 
31 Ibid., pp. 47, 48. 
32 Ibid., p. 49. 
33 Ibid., p.50. 
34 Ibid., p.80. 
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England, in the work of Phillimore, above all, for whom recourse to Roman 
law as right reason was natural.35 He addresses the idea that for Vattel the 
law of nature “is not less obligatory upon states than on individuals, because 
States are composed of men …”36 However, the distinction between a law of 
nations for individuals in the 17th century as compared to the 20th century is 
lost on him, and it will be necessary to come back to this in the section 
devoted specifically to the treatment of the domestic analogy in 
contemporary international relations theory. 
Here Lauterpacht is misunderstanding the most basic reality of 
international society since at least the 17th century that it consists of 
sovereign states, which are anything but voluntary associations of 
individuals, without any collective drive or impact apart from that attaching 
to individuals who compose it. He misunderstands as well that the absence 
of a world state problematises the place of law and morality in relations 
among states, to a degree different in kind rather than degree from the 
domestic relations of states, and he projects these blind spots onto a 
responsibility specific to German legal and political philosophy. In fact it is 
precisely the French who created, on the European continent, the modern 
state, through the theory of Jean Bodin. It is remarkable that Lauterpacht 
does note how the leading French international lawyers of his time, Bonfils- 
Fauchille (the leading contemporary text), Despagnet and others, “deal at 
length with the sources of international law and its relation with private 
international law, to morality, to international courtesy, to politics and 
diplomacy, but no mention is made of private law proper …”37 
Lauterpacht was enough of a scholar to notice the discrepancy, but not 
open minded enough to explore it. For instance he notes that Bodin had a 
theory of absolute sovereignty of the state, but he simply reassures himself, 
on the authority of Verdross, that it was not the same as Hegel’s,38 which is 
true enough, but little consolation. Bodin’s place has to be seen as an 
ideologue of a very problematic consolidation of the state from the 16th 
century onwards. Lauterpacht is, of course, right to identify a serious 
problem for international law, but wrong to identify it with Hegel as the 
originator. In the standard international law textbook, which has built into it 
an historical perspective, Cassese explains that from the 16th century, beyond 
the Roman Catholic Church and the Empire, remembering that the Protestant 
 
35 Ibid., pp. 26, 27. 
36 Ibid., pp. 80, 81. 
37 Ibid., p. 30. 
38 Ibid., p. 44. 
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churches are purely national, all significations are concentrated in the state. 
This allows Cassese to say that the lack of strong political, ideological and 
economic links between states (as Christian principles were not allowed to 
override national interest) resulted in self-interest holding sway.39 The 
absolutist state has had to mean the disappearance of a universal 
international legal order. In the period of transition from the medieval-feudal 
system of public authority over land and population to the modern absolutist 
state in the course of the 16th and early 17th centuries, the focus of public 
lawyers was on the terms of submission of subjects to rulers. The tradition 
that the central legal concept should be jurisdiction (of a lord over his vassals 
in his court) gave way to the more nebulous notion of the limits of the 
supreme power (potestas suprema), in effect, of an unconstrained executive. 
For this power to have sought or found justification would have meant 
looking to a law of the Holy Roman Empire or of the Papacy, as this was the 
traditional sense given to the existence of a higher authority. The authority of 
the prince was given a rationale by political theorists such as Bodin.40 The 
very idea of absolute authority had to mean its separation from any argument 
of legitimacy of the relationship of ruler to ruled. The legal development 
marked a separation of the governing power from concrete legal relations, 
where primary importance was given to the concept of frontier as the means 
of delimiting the territorial scope of the prince’s power.41 
Territory came to be defined merely as the areas of command of the 
prince, with a supposedly unquestioning duty of the subject to owe 
submission to the prince. The difficulty, from the late 17th century till the 
20th century, and particularly in the 18th century, was that the territorial 
princes of Europe did not obtain thereby a convincing legal foundation for 
their possessions, for instance land and population. The focus was simply on 
the advantages of internal order which would follow from a generalized 
submission. As a result there were ever-harsher territorial conflicts as the 
notion of the need for princely authority in political theory was not matched 
by an international-European consensus on the basis for territorial title at the 
international level. There had been a sacrifice of even domestic political 
legitimacy, for instance, based on the consent of the population in favour of 
the value of domestic public safety. This was understandable, in the context 
 
39 A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, 2001) para. 11. What follows in this 
section draws from chs. 3 and 4 of A. Carty, Philosophy of International Law 
(Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
40 D. Willoweit, Rechtsgrundlagen der Territorialgewalt (Boelau, Cologne, 1975) 
pp. 123–126, 129–131. 
41 Ibid., pp. 275, 276. 
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of bloody civil wars, for instance, after the Wars of Religion. However, 
safety was conceived of in purely internal and not international terms.42 
In the 18th century Vattel made a decisive yet harshly contested entrance. 
Vattel is, of course, Swiss, but his influence became dominant in much of 
continental Europe in the 19th century, particularly in France. As a French 
historian of international law, Emmanuelle Jouannet demonstrates the same 
continuity of the medieval legal method throughout the 17th and early 18th 
century from Grotius to Vattel. All the major legal figures continue some 
version of the medieval method. The main figures are Grotius himself and 
what Jouannet describes as his disciples, Rachel, Zouche, Textor and 
Bynkershoek.43 The reason why international law had not until Vattel 
become an autonomous discipline in its modern recognisable form is rather 
surprising. Jouannet traces how none of the earlier jurists conceived of the 
state or nation, words used interchangeably, as a corporate entity distinct 
from the person of the government or the prince. There are traces of the idea 
of the state as a corporate entity in the writings of Hobbes, which have also 
exercised an influence on Pufendorf.44 However, even these two writers 
remained with the concept of government alone rather than developing a 
concept of a corporate entity, which embraced both the governor and the 
governed. The elements, which would make up the modern state in 
international law, i.e. government, territory and population, remained the 
property of the prince. He had a territory and a population, in a patrimonial 
sense. Such a personalised concept of authority directs attention to 
individuals and favours the retention of the medieval idea of a common law 
of human beings applied to the leaders of nations. Grotian style erudition 
prevails into the 18th century to regulate the affairs of princes, in their 
relations with one another, but also in their domestic and even private 
affairs. Lauterpacht does not realise that, at least in Jouannet’s view, this 
world of individual law or morality is a lost past, which cannot be recovered, 
also the view of much contemporary international relations theory (see the 
next section). 
It is with the Vattelian critique of Christian Wolff that one arrives at the 
modern conception of international law, where sovereignty as a legal 
concept comes to play a central part. Absolutely central is the notion of the 
 
42 Ibid., pp. 306, 307, 349, 350, 360, 361. 
43 E. Jouannet, L’Emergence: Part II Autonomisation du Droit des Gens (doctoral 
thesis, Paris, 1993) pp. 141–147. 
44 Ibid., pp. 300–324. 
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corporate character of the state. As a legal entity, it has to be separate from 
both government and governed. It is the state and not the government or 
prince which is subject to international law. It is and can be subject to 
international law only if it is sovereign, that is, equally independent of all 
other states.45 What Jouannet is, above all, anxious to stress is that law 
should have a dualist character in what she calls the classical form of 
international law. It is essential to the idea of the corporate character of the 
state that there should be no relations of individuals with one another across 
state boundaries. All the relations of individuals, for the purpose of 
international law, are absorbed into the corporate identity of the state, which 
then has legal relations with other states. In this way it is the sovereign 
equality of independent states which defines the object and scope of the rules 
of international law. 
This is precisely what creates the need for institutions of law particularly 
suited to the legal character of the state as such, and not the relations of 
private individuals. This remains a central thesis of continental European 
public international law. Yet, unlike Lauterpacht, Jouannet sees no difficulty 
in the Vattelian sovereign being integrated into an international legal order. 
The lack of difficulty is hardly surprising because this new legal order is 
made by states specifically for their relations with one another.46 It is 
because states have no rights over one another that they have need of a law 
which recognises that they are independent and equal.47 In other words, 
there need be no inhuman, violent or threatening consequences in the 
expectation that states need laws especially suited to their character rather 
than to that of private individuals. That is why the French international 
lawyers mentioned by Lauterpacht give no attention to private law. Jouannet 
appears to see the entire exercise as taxonomy of what relates or properly 
belongs to the rights and duties of nations rather than individuals. The idea 
that there should be rules specifically designed for the character of sovereign 
states can hardly pose problems of legally binding character.48 The aim of 
this taxonomic exercise is to register a break with the Roman and medieval 
tradition of law. The progressive character of this law is that it incorporates 
the two great principles of liberty and equality of states as the very basis of 
the society of nations in place of the genre humain (human kind) of the 
 
45 Ibid., pp. 354–388, especially 384 et seq. 
46 J. Bartelson, A Geneology of Sovereignty (Cambridge, 1995) pp. 137–185, a 
summary of chapter 5, How policy became foreign. 
47 Ibid., pp. 194, 195 (author’s emphasis). 
48 Jouannet, supra note 43, p. 447. 
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naturalists. Now the nation can govern itself without dependence upon what 
is foreign to it.49 The constant theme of this argument is the corporate 
character of the sovereign. Because sovereign nations deal only directly with 
one another, they can only see one another as societies of men of whom all 
the interests are held in common. It is not a law of nations derived from 
human nature which rules them, but a law derived from the particular nature 
of the state.50 Here, Vattel, not Hegel, provides a very elaborate rejection of 
the law of nature, as it applied to individuals in the earlier international law 
tradition of Grotius, etc., to his modern international or inter-state law. 
None of this is to say that Lauterpacht is mistaken to be uneasy about the 
idea that states have a unique character, distinct from individual human 
beings, which requires a law appropriate to them. The point is simply that 
this juridical direction is not attributable to German international law 
science. It is so interesting to give a prominent place to Jouannet’s argument 
because she reflects well the fact that many international lawyers are so little 
troubled by the concept of sovereignty. She is aware of the problem of 
subjective appreciation but manages to make it appear that those who stress 
it misunderstand the structure of international law and lack the technical 
expertise to understand how it is supposed, following its own nature, to 
function. Jouannet admits that Vattel keeps the principle of the subjective 
appreciation of each state in the application of the law,51 but considers it is 
unjust to make him responsible for the increasing voluntarism of 
international law. 
Voluntarism means that all of the body of international law depends 
upon the continuing consent of states. They can, at any time, cease to accept 
that a rule binds them, and even cease to recognise other states as subjects of 
the law. Vattel is not responsible for such a view. He merely introduces the 
logic of Hobbsean and Lockean individualism into international law, in 
terms of the liberty and sovereignty of states as the foundation of 
international law.52 A doctrine of the autonomy of states is not a doctrine of 
absolute or unlimited external sovereignty. It is not a non-submission to a 
superior juridical order but an autonomy of a political entity vis-à-vis other 
equally independent entities. The root of the confusion, in Jouannet’s view, 
is to have made a too rapid combination of the question of the application of 
 
49 Ibid., p. 448. 
50 Ibid., p. 451. 
51 Ibid., pp. 454–458. 
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international law with the decentralised structure of the community of states. 
There is no compulsory international adjudication. So states have to interpret 
for themselves the extent of their rights. She says the question of the 
subjective appreciation of the law is not an aspect or logical consequence of 
voluntarism in international law, a doctrine that all law is a product of state 
will, but arises from the conditions for the application of the law in a 
decentralised international legal order. International law is a universal-abstract 
law, but appreciated unilaterally because subjectively and therefore 
it functions in practice as a series of reciprocal and bilateral interpretations 
given to it by states. Vattel simply marks a reflection of a change at an 
international level which had been occurring generally in legal culture – a 
movement towards individualisation and subjectivisation of law, combined 
with a realist vision of international relations where states have a mission to 
act to assure their security and preserve their interests. It is not Vattel who 
introduces this subjectivity into international law. It is simply an unavoidable 
fact of international law in the absence of any supra-state power. So, in the 
beginning and middle of the 20th century it is not this subjectivist, 
decentralised appreciation inherent in the structure of the international 
community which is the problem, but the legitimacy of the use of force 
which accompanies it.53 
Of course, Lauterpacht is perfectly entitled to be less sanguine about the 
prospects for humanity of an exclusively inter-state law. Indeed, it is worth 
considerable reflection that James Brierly, Lauterpachts’s virtual 
contemporary in England, was equally upset about the general condition of 
international law after the First World War, but perhaps ironically, he, as a 
native Englishman, seemed to believe that the fault lay with the French. Of 
course, Vattel was not French, but Brierly’s polemic against him was in the 
context of his apparent, and in Jouannet’s case, continued appropriation by 
the French. In his magisterial introduction to international law, The Law of 
Nations, Brierly quotes at length the French international lawyer Albert De 
Lapradelle on the significance of Vattel, whose text Le Droit des gens, 
published in 1758, is usually regarded as the standard founding statement of 
modern international law. The Frenchman praises Vattel for having written 
in advance of the events, which the book represents, the principles of 1776 
and 1789 of the American and French Revolutions. Vattel is credited with 
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 projecting onto the plane of the law of nations the principles of legal 
individualism. Vattel has written the international law of political liberty.54 
Brierly comments astutely that the survival of the “principles of legal 
individualism” has been a disaster for international law. The so-called 
natural independence of states cannot explain or justify their subjection to 
law and does not admit of a social bond between nations. Vattel has cut 
international law from any sound principle of obligation, an injury that has 
never been repaired.55 The brief focus here will be on Brierly’s critique of 
Vattel on the use of force since it is most relevant to concerns about the 
inhumanity of inter-state law. Vattel makes each state the sole judge of its 
own actions, accountable for its observance of natural law only to its own 
conscience.56 This reduces natural law to “little more than an aspiration after 
better relations between states …”57 For instance, by necessary law (natural 
law) there are only three lawful causes of war: self-defence, redress of injury 
and punishment of offences. By voluntary law (effectively the positive law 
based on consent) each side has, we must assume, a lawful cause for going 
to war “for Princes may have had wise and just reasons for acting thus and 
that is sufficient at the tribunal of the voluntary law of nations …” 58 
Brierly is telling us that the very categories of thought which the 
international law tradition since Vattel offers makes it impossible to think of 
that law effectively restraining the recourse of states to violence. However, 
Brierly appears to point the finger at the very foundations of individualist 
Western legal and political culture when attributing responsibility for the 
crisis. Brierly attacks the very individualism which Lauterpacht appears to 
think is progressive as an anarchistic and nihilistic force. Clearly he sees no 
place for private law analogies and worked instead in his life for a revival of 
an objective natural law.59 
 
54 J. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford University Press, Oxford/Boston, 1963) 
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[end of page 100] 
 
 
5. Private Law Analogy: Could Lauterpacht Have Addressed Standards of 
International Morality More Directly? 
 
In this short essay it is only intended, by way of conclusion, to raise some 
general questions about what Lauterpacht was trying to achieve with Private 
Law Sources and Analogies of International Law. His general conviction, in 
what one might perhaps call progressive, ideological terms, is to insist that 
states must be subject to the same standards of behaviour, whether 
characterised as moral or legal, as individuals. The main difficulty in 
achieving this is the Hegalian value attributed to the state, which gives it 
such a superhuman status that it can be absolved from normal standards of 
human behaviour. The main remedy, and at the same time proof of the 
falseness of Hegelianism in technical international law terms, is the 
recognition that the international legal order, and particularly judicial and 
arbitral tribunals, actually apply private law analogies in resolving inter-state 
legal disputes. My reflection on these arguments is that the legal practice to 
which Lauterpacht refers has nothing progressive or humane about it, and 
that Lauterpacht misidentifies the nature of the problem of the overbearing 
state by attributing it exclusively to German Hegelianism. 
The question is whether and how to take the matter further. As I have 
argued in, and since, the publication The Decay of International Law?,60 the 
level of conceptual, historical and philosophical debate about the discipline 
of international law is so ossified in most European countries that a work of 
such intellectual ambition as Lauterpacht’s above-mentioned work can be 
published without provoking any intelligent discussion whatever, apart from 
the general adulation which seems to accompany anything Lauterpacht has 
done.61 The same is not true of the discipline of international relations, which 
is in an infinitely more intellectually healthy condition in Britain. From the 
beginning, one of its most senior protagonists challenged Lauterpacht, and 
Lauterpacht, at least, gave serious thought to responding. Perhaps if he had 
directed more of his energies to his international relations opponents and less 
to his own profession, he might have been stimulated to presentations of his 
views on states and private morality which could have had a resonance wider 
than international law circles. 
To repeat the argument stated more than 20 years ago in The Decay of 
International Law, Lauterpacht thought private law analogies could be 
expected to play a large part in the development of international law because 
 
60 A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? (Manchester University Press, 1986). 
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such, in effect, judicial activity could only be understood in the wider 
context of a commitment to the goal of international organisation. Jurists 
drew analogies between international and municipal law concepts within a 
framework which was to replace the politics of international relations with 
institutions approximating as far as possible to those of a world state.62 
Already in 1939, E. H. Carr objected that Lauterpacht did not complete his 
own argument, that judges in adjudication could determine any question if 
states wished by showing how arbitration could still be promoted in a noninstitutional 
system where political disagreements remained basic. For 
instance, at that time, the Soviets rejected the idea of private ownership, and 
the UK rejected the limits on a law of blockade at sea. In particular, Carr 
argued, jurists had not studied the suitability of the private law analogy 
itself, apart from the institutional framework in which it was born: “[T]here 
is no principle of law which enables one to decide whether a rule of law or 
legal institution which has proved its value in a national community should 
be introduced by analogy into international law.”63 
Carr pinned down the nature of the problem in a manner which has been 
taken up continuously in post-War international relations debates. He says 
the problem about the application of law to the settlement of disputes is, in 
its final analysis, 
 
“the fundamental one of the relation of the rights of the individual 
to the needs of the community. Every national community has 
necessarily found a working solution of this problem. The 
international community has not yet done so. The controversy 
about the freedom of the seas shows that Great Britain would be 
unwilling to risk any interpretation of her maritime rights by an 
international court in the light of the supposed needs of the 
international community as a whole; and there are important 
matters on which every other Great Power would make similar 
reservations. The absence of an accepted view of the general good 
of the community as a whole overriding the particular good of any 
individual member of it, which we have already noted as the 
crucial problem of international morality, also stands in the way of 
the development of judicial settlement in its application to 
international disputes.”64 
 
62 Carty, supra note 60, p. 80. 
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Lauterpacht was certainly aware of Carr’s book. There is a paper entitled 
Professor Carr on International Morality.65 Here Lauterpacht identifies the 
question directly, assuming the reality of the personality of the state, whether 
that reality can be maintained consistently with upholding a single standard 
of morality for states and individuals. It does not follow from the reality of 
the state “that the obligations of states are not the obligations of individuals 
acting on their behalf; and that the morality of states is different from the 
morality of individuals”.66 Lauterpacht observes what is precisely at issue is 
not some abstract argument that group personality is entirely distinct from 
that of its component parts, a controversial thesis. Rather, the group, even if 
it is a legal fiction, is a convenient instrument of thinking. 
Lauterpacht nails the problem in the fact that 
 
“[t]he existence of a group is a powerful inducement to laxity in 
conduct. The opportunity to shift the burden or moral doubt upon 
the impersonal shoulders of the amorphous association is a 
motivating force in the nature of a temptation, which only a most 
scrupulous fortitude of mind and principle can hope to overcome 
with ease. There is nothing mystical about the group. But there is 
about it the constant threat of the suggestion that it represents an 
interest greater in the scale of values than the private interest of 
the acting individual. From this there is only one step to the view 
that the individual is entitled to gauge the action to be taken by a 
standard different from that which he would be bound to adopt if 
he acted on his own behalf. From this it is only another step 
towards the final view that the individual is not at liberty when 
acting as a trustee for others to afford the luxury of private 
morality. This particular argument has been repeatedly put 
forward. A moment’s consideration shows that the argument is 
grotesquely inadequate. It is difficult to understand why the 
interests of other persons on behalf of whom we are acting should 
be so different and so much higher in the scale of values than our 
own as to warrant the adoption of different moral standards.”67 
 
This is surely a lucid undercutting of the traditional Machiavellian argument 
that the prince must judge the interests of a collective differently from how 
he would judge his own. Lauterpacht identifies the devious and venal 
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character of such reasoning. He mounts a critique of the whole picture of the 
1930s that Carr draws, and argues that there is no consistent empirical 
evidence that contemporary democracies will accept double standards in 
international life and manifestly, morally ruthless behaviour of one’s own 
country in relation to other countries – a lynchpin of Carr’s argument that 
there is no international standard of the common good. In Lauterpacht’s 
view, it is precisely because in the final analysis, the individual remains the 
ultimate unit of government and state action, that “the doctrine of duality of 
moral standards has never struck deep roots in democracies”.68 Lauterpacht’s 
formulation of his case is very shrewd. He is not presenting a doctrinaire 
argument about the moral superiority of democracies. Democracy is not the 
best instrument for operating a long-term foreign policy. “It does not exhibit 
a temerity of purpose and a degree of foresight necessary for the effective 
organization of an international system of peace and collective security.”69 
Deficiencies of collective memory mean democracy will fail “to exhibit the 
necessary loyalty and fidelity to obligations undertaken on its behalf in the 
field of collective security”.70 However, where an issue of deliberate 
immorality of government officials, ostensibly in the national interest of 
their own country, comes clearly to the attention of the wider public in a 
democracy, one must hardly be surprised if there is an upsurge of outrage in 
the country which sweeps away the government officials. This will not 
happen with absolute consistency, but it will be frequent enough to disturb 
and unsettle the whole idea of realpolitik. 
Lauterpacht takes the example of the Hoare-Laval incident. Hoare was 
himself publicly denounced of a “terrible crime”. Public outrage at the Hoare 
Laval Plan, in the context of the Italian-Abyssinian War, was so intense “that 
it swept like a cleansing breeze through the entrenched citadel of a 
Government supported by a powerful and docile parliamentary majority”.71 
With great simplicity, Lauterpacht nails the issue. Just as if I cheat or bully 
in the course of a game in the interest of my team, or for friends and family I 
resort to cheating or lying, I still act immorally. So it is also the fact “that 
popular feeling spontaneously and almost invariably disapproves of any 
manifestations of or attempts at inferior international morality”.72 
There is a more abstract aspect to the disagreement between Lauterpacht 
and Carr, which is more difficult to pin down, where Lauterpacht is not so 
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convincing, and that is in his espousal of the philosophy of political 
liberalism, whether located nationally or internationally. This is a point, as 
we have seen, that Koskenniemi identified as being at the heart of 
Lauterpacht’s basically progressive optimism, based upon a methodological, 
economic individualism. Carr argues that “[t]he conception of morality 
implies the recognition of principles of a universally binding character”.73 
The way to resolve contradictions between our own national interest and an 
international interest is either to identify the good of the whole with the good 
of the fittest (Hitler’s philosophy) or the neo-liberal doctrine of the harmony 
of interests. The latter approach is espoused by Woodrow Wilson, Lord 
Cecil and Professor Toynbee. Carr makes a critique of the latter, which is 
especially poignant at the present time. He identifies the Achilles Heel of 
Anglo-American “international morality”, which is that national morality is 
comparable to individual morality in being equally self-deceptive and 
egoistic. The doctrine of neo-liberalism, “like every doctrine of a natural 
harmony of interests, identifies the good of the whole with the security of 
those in possession”.74 Wilson’s view that American principles are those of 
mankind and Toynbee’s that the British Empire’s security was the supreme 
interest of the whole world, were the same as Hitler saying that Germans 
were the bearers of a higher ethic. So, argues Carr, “the same result is 
produced of identifying the good of the whole international community with 
the good of that part of it in which we are particularly interested”.75 
Carr quotes Hobhouse as saying that liberalism has an ethical component 
which has to accommodate inevitable conflicts of interest by supplementing 
prudence and judgement with a specifically ethical element. This is the 
breaking point for Carr. The constellation of interests in international society 
will reflect hegemony, and if the hegemony is to survive there must be a 
willingness to make sacrifices to those who are dissatisfied with the status 
quo and want changes. This is impossible to achieve if one assumes, as do 
the satisfied powers, that the process of give-and-take operates only within 
the existing order and that one’s own interests as a satisfied power are 
identical with those of the whole world. This is effectively Britain’s position. 
Carr quotes Anthony Eden as saying that international peace depends upon 
an international order with nations leagued together to preserve it. Each 
nation makes its contribution because therein lies its own interest. This 
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ignores the fact that “the process of give-and-take must apply to challenges 
to the existing order”.76 
Lauterpacht’s reaction to this argument has several elements, writing in 
1941 he can dismiss out of hand an equation of the pronouncements and 
conduct of Hitler’s Germany with those of Britain, the United States and 
other democracies.77 He adds to this a bold statement that no serious 
criticism can be made of the diplomatic history of either the United States or 
Britain.78 The desire of such countries for international order and 
organisation may be identified, as Carr does, with a hypocritical desire to 
preserve national interest, but “it is also possible to see in their advocacy of 
an effective rule of law among nations a summons to the creation … of the 
orderly processes of a politically organised community”.79 He identifies the 
British and American approaches to world society as “based upon the view 
that the supreme national interest is identified with the rule of law among 
states, with a submission to the impersonal sovereignty of the law, with the 
willingness to forgo progressively rights of sovereignty for the sake of the 
greater whole ultimately beneficial to the component parts”.80 
In my judgement the most fundamental element of Lauterpacht’s 
argument is ironically – and he is vaguely aware of the irony – that he sets 
much lower standards of morality than Carr, and he is complacently 
nationalistic throughout. He cannot achieve the detachment from his adopted 
country’s national goals which comes so easily to Carr. He says, contrary to 
Carr, that the inability of the state to show altruism and self-sacrifice is 
irrelevant: 
 
“Self-sacrifice and altruism in the nature of self-sacrifice are not the basis 
of private morality. Morality does not enjoin us to sacrifice our life and 
interests for the good of others …81 
 
Contrary to Professor Carr’s view, the frequently asserted right of self- 
preservation of the state need not override its moral obligations. 
Undoubtedly, the appeal to the right of self-preservation has often been 
abused, but there are clearly cases in which an appeal to the right of self- 
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preservation, although violative of the legal rights of another state, is not 
inconsistent either with legal or moral obligations. International law fully 
recognises the right of a state to override, in certain contingencies, the legal 
rights of other states. If the seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807 had been 
brought about as a result of a justifiable belief that the very existence of 
Great Britain was at stake, the action would not have been inconsistent either 
with international law or international morality. The only question which has 
divided writers on this point was whether the emergency was in fact such as 
to justify the action taken …”82 
 
Lauterpacht himself concludes his argument against Carr, at times 
somewhat bitter, on a light and ironical note. Carr thinks self-sacrifice from 
states is necessary for international peace, but unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Lauterpacht thinks self-sacrifice would not be forthcoming, but is in any way 
unnecessary generally in constructing morality and unnecessary in 
international society because of the fine character of the British and 
Americans.83 
Elihu Lauterpacht says that he was reluctant to publish Professor Carr 
and International Morality, a manuscript probably written in 1941, because 
of its polemical tone and relatively unrestrained style. However, he decided 
to do so because the work sheds light on Lauterpacht’s own positive views.84 
I am only glad that he has done so. I have paid no attention to the rather 
harsher comments that Lauterpacht makes about Carr, partially because 
throughout this short article I have not endeavoured to be biographical, but 
have tried to stick to the texts themselves. To my mind the most important 
and most unfortunate aspect of this last work is that it was not published at 
all. This had the effect that the leading international lawyer of mid-20th 
century Britain did not engage in open controversy with the most important 
specialist of international relations in the country. If a debate had ensued – 
Carr invited it with the frequent criticism of Lauterpacht’s work in his own 
book – then it might have been possible that the two disciplines could have 
made a joint effort to grapple with the problems that both recognised, 
although the perception has always been sharper on the side of international 
relations. 
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It might be not without interest to conclude with a few remarks about 
how the debate among international relations scholars about the “domestic 
analogy” has been conducted since 1945. The authoritative Hedley Bull 
understood that to mean “the argument from the experience of individual 
men in domestic society to the experience of states … The conditions of an 
orderly social life, on this view, are the same among states as they are within 
them: they require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on 
a universal scale …”.85 The possibilities of dialogue are raised only to be 
dismissed fairly quickly. Suganami quotes an instance of domestic analogy 
in legal reasoning. D. W. Bowett had argued that the right of collective self-defence 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter could not be exercised by a state 
which could not legally have exercised a right of individual self-defence in 
the same circumstances. This interpretation, says Suganami, following 
Michael Akehurst, was based on analogies from English law that it would 
not allow one person to use force in defence of another unless there was a 
close relationship, for example a family relationship, between the two 
persons concerned.86 These indications from Bowett and Akehurst hint of the 
wealth of material which might be uncovered if one were to explore the 
“citation history” of Private Law Sources and Analogies of International 
Law in British international law scholarship and Foreign Office legal 
advising. 
However, Suganami is immediately dismissive of this rather promising 
attempt of Bowett to apply common law reasoning to international society. 
He says: 
 
“Bowett’s argument is advanced as an interpretation of existing 
law, and therefore it is a legal argument. Although the boundary 
line between what is to count as an interpretation of existing law 
and what is in effect an argument de lege ferenda may in some 
cases be obscure, municipal law analogies which occur within the 
framework of international legal discourse, purporting to state 
what the law is on a given issue, may be separated from what 
writers on international relations normally mean by the “domestic 
analogy”. For this we need to look into projects for the 
reorganization of international society. 
 
85 H. Suganami, ‘Reflections on the Domestic Analogy: The Case of Bull, Beitz and 
Linklater’, 12:2 Review of International Affairs (1986) p. 145. 
86 Ibid., p. 147. 
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One such project is found in the writings of James 
Lorimer…According to him, the ultimate problem of international 
jurisprudence was to find international equivalents for the factors 
known to national law as legislation, adjudication and 
execution.”87 
 
This is clearly an intellectual move dominated by the academic hierarchies 
of the post-War discipline of international relations in Britain. The issue has 
been defined in institutional terms by that discipline, i.e. not whether there 
were common moral, legal normative or whatever standards which could be 
transferred from the domestic to the international level, but whether 
domestic institutions of statehood could or should be replicated globally. 
Hence, Suganami sees no paradox in ending his dismissal of international 
law with a reference to the relevance of a programme of an international 
lawyer. The question then becomes: how much international organisation do 
we need? Hedley Bull himself said that we had to abandon the domestic 
analogy because international society is unique and owes its nature to 
qualities peculiar to the situation of sovereign states.88 
At the same time Suganami wants to keep the door open for resort to 
domestic analogy, objecting to one “uncritically extending the prevalent 
belief in the limitations of institutional domestic analogies (which in turn 
may deserve a more careful examination than is usually given) to other 
forms of argument which, while in some way resembling the domestic 
analogy proper, are in fact logically distinct from it”.89 However, any 
pathway back to Lauterpacht will probably remain barred because Suganami 
accepts the sovereign state system as the starting point and then considers 
whether the domestic analogy is a useful inspiration for attempts to go 
beyond this in the League of Nations and the United Nations.90 Lauterpacht, 
as Carr identified, thought he could proceed with, effectively, international 
judicial government alone, based upon the resources especially of private 
law. The reason for this was, as already stated, that individuals managed 
states, just as they managed social, family and private matters. It was one 
common world. Lauterpacht began his book by calling upon the example of 
the founders of the discipline of international law, Gentili, Grotius and 
 
87 Ibid., pp.147, 148. 
88 C. Bottici, ‘The Domestic Analogy and the Kantian Project of Perpetual Peace’ 
11 The Journal of Political Philosophy (2003) p. 392. 
89 Suganami, supra note 85, p. 156. 
90 H. Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989). 
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Bynkershoek.91 However, Lauterpacht shows no awareness that such legal 
experience might become irrelevant after the system of sovereign states had 
been fully consolidated, except to argue that “things went wrong when the 
Germans came along”.92 
In contrast, Suganami rejects as historically distinctive the natural law 
writers of the early modern period, whom he acknowledges did use 
municipal law sources, Roman ius gentium in particular. He quotes Holland 
as saying that international law was the application to nations of legal ideas, 
which originally applied to individuals. Yet Suganami realises that this 
world was dominated still by the belief in natural law: 
 
“It is questionable, however, whether very early writers 
considered their legal reasoning as being analogical when they 
asserted that certain principles governed the relations of 
sovereigns. These principles, in their view, were axiomatic and 
governed human conduct universally. It was because of this 
universal validity that, in their view, Natural Law governed 
international relations.”93 
 
When commenting on Private Law Sources and Analogies of International 
Law, Koskenniemi says that by “conducting his study in the form of an 
examination of practice, Lauterpacht is able to attack voluntarist positivism 
on its own terrain of scientific factuality without having to resort to the 
moralizing rhetoric of naturalism or the formalism of the pure theory of 
law”.94 I have no idea what is meant by scientific factuality or the moralising 
rhetoric of naturalism. However, I find that when Lauterpacht abandoned his 
fascination with imperialist arbitrations or his obsession with the eternal 
wickedness of Germans, and directed a dispassionate moral irony against the 
sophistry of Carr’s apologies for the disgraceful behaviour of European 
states in the late 1930s, he was at his most inspiring and convincing. In my 
view Lauterpacht’s exposure of the sophistries of individual immorality 
ostensibly practised on behalf of the group is natural law reasoning at its 
best, a discursive narrative which uses a Socratic irony to make the presence 
of moral standards obvious to everyone. I think he could have spent his time 
better in such activity than as an academic lawyer and international judge. 
 
91 Lauterpacht, supra note 9, pp.10–16. 
92 Ibid., pp. 17 et seq., Modern International Law. The Positive School in Germany. 
93 Suganami, supra note 85, p. 149. 
94 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, p. 365. 
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The general intellectual health of post-War Britain would have benefited if 
he had pursued Carr as relentlessly as Carr had pursued him. Maybe it was 
because of his adopted status in British society, a welcomed immigrant from 
Eastern Europe, that, as his son writes, “Lauterpacht normally avoided the 
public pursuit of controversy”.95 
 
95 Lauterpacht, supra note 9, p. 67. 
